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We consider the lack of consensus about an appropriate theoretical framework linking sub-
indicators as a defining characteristic of composite indicators.  This intrinsic feature implies 
uncertainties about the appropriate normalisation and aggregation of the raw data.  The two 
are related: index theory offers some valuable guidelines about their connection.  Yet these do 
not  fully  solve  the  basic  problem  of  expert  disagreement.    We  embed  such  (residual) 
disagreement in the aggregation method itself.  Specifically, we apply an impartial benefit-of-
the-doubt  weighting  procedure,  where  weight  restrictions  incorporate  the  available 
information  on  experts’  opinions.  We  apply  this  procedure  to  the  dynamic  performance 
assessment of EU Internal Market effects, thereby highlighting its capacity to disaggregate 
member  states’  observed  performance  shifts  into  changes  UHODWLYH WR  benchmarks  and 
performance  changes  RI  the  benchmarks  (i.e.  catching  up  versus  genuine  progress).  Our 
results indicate that the latter factor is more important in explaining the observed progress.  

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Policy makers and their watchdogs rely on numerous data to know where they are and 
how they got there.  The past century has seen massive efforts in statistical capacity building, 
which indisputably enlarged the informational basis of policy decisions.   However, there are 
some indications that this basis has reached its limits.  Organisations such as the UN, the 
OECD, or the European Commission, which traditionally act upon the presumption that better 
knowledge is a necessary condition for better public decision-making, nowadays appear to 
have mixed feelings about  the  overabundance of statistics.    At least, one may infer this 
reluctance from the fact that such organisations, which have a long history as providers of 
many excellent and detailed statistics, have recently either singled out some “key indicators” 
or have constructed “composite indicators” in which several single indicators are aggregated 
into one index.  This paper looks at the latter type of composite indicators, which comprise 
the  UN’s  Human  Development  Indices,  the  OECD’s  Composite  Leading  Indicators,  the 
WHO’s Health System Performance Index, the World Economic Forum’s Competitiveness 
index, etc. An extensive list of such indicators and methodological discussions can be found 
on  the  European  Commission  and  OECD’s  composite  indicator  information  server 
(http://farmweb.jrc.cec.eu.int/ci/). 
 Strictly  speaking,  composite  indicators  are  far  from  new  measures.    Well-known 
indicators such as GDP, the CPI, the Gini coefficient, and so on, also merge information 
about different markets or agents into a single number.  Each of these is firmly entrenched as 
a policy instrument, despite the fact that they continue to be criticized as inadequate measures 
of  the  underlying  phenomena  they  purport  to  quantify.      To  mention  but  a  few  familiar 
criticisms: GDP is not an adequate indicator of a country’s economic activity (let alone of its 
citizens’ well-being) if only because it neglects the underground economy per definition; the 
CPI  is at  best just a  rudimentary  estimate  of  changes  in  the true  cost-of-living;  the  Gini   3 
coefficient  is  rooted  in  a  rather  distinct  welfarist  framework  when  comparing  individual 
incomes, etc.     
Nevertheless, it is safe to say that such traditional aggregates are presently far less 
controversial than their more recent cognates.   Many of their creators even present the new 
brand of composite indicators in an apologetic style.  Likewise, the European Commision’s 
generic definition – “FRPSRVLWHLQGLFDWRUVDUHEDVHGRQVXELQGLFDWRUVWKDWKDYHQRFRPPRQ
PHDQLQJIXOPHDVXUHPHQWXQLWDQGWKHUHLVQRREYLRXVZD\RIZHLJKWLQJWKHVHVXELQGLFDWRUV” 
(as e.g. found on the aforementioned website) – alludes to their contentious nature.  And in 
fact, once introduced, they often stir critical analyses of various elements that underlie their 
construction.
1  
To some extent, it is ironic that the new composite indicators are presented with a list 
of pros and cons attached (see e.g. Saisana HWDO 2005) that is in large measure appropriate 
for their older counterparts as well.   Still, while aggregation is a concern in many economic 
contexts, the precise nature of the aggregation problem for composite indicators is different 
from the one relating to ‘traditional’ aggregates.  Indeed, one can say that for aggregates such 
as GDP the predominant issue is not KRZ to aggregate – aggregation is taken to be linear–, but 
rather ZKDW variables to include; only market goods and services are included, and non-market 
goods  and  services  such  as  the  underground  economy,  work  in  the  home,  environmental 
impacts,  etc.,  are  excluded  (on  the  environmental  discussion,  see  e.g.  Nordhaus  and 
Kokkelenberg,  1999).  Quite  distinct  from  that,  the  economic  theory  of  production  and 
consumption, based on optimising behaviour, duality theory and the theory of separability, 
imposes strict conditions for commodity aggregation on functions such as production, cost, 
profit, utility (examples include food in a utility function, labour in a production function, the 
wage  rate  in  a  cost  function,  etc.).  Except  under  extreme  conditions  on  technology  or 
preferences, these aggregator functions are not linear. The issue in that particular area is, 
hence, one of functional form.  Finally, for the composite indicators problem the predominant 
focus is also on KRZ to aggregate, but economic theory based on optimisation, duality and 
separability  provides  no  guidance.  Specifically,  whereas  an  essential  feature  of  the  other 
examples is that H[RJHQRXV market prices act as natural weights, composite indicators are 
distinguished  by  the  absence  of  market  prices  and  the  need  to  search  for  an  alternative 
weighting system. For example, one has to rely on expert judgement, but then the further 
issue is raised that experts can and do disagree about such weights. 
                                                
1 The Human Development Index is a well-known case in point.  See e.g., among many articles, the recent ones 
of Chakravarty (2003), Lind (2004), or Chatterjee (2005).    4 
 
So, there is undeniably a particular epistemological sense in which the new composite 
indicators differ from their nowadays less contested precursors: at heart, the newcomers lack a 
sufficient degree of scientific consensus about an appropriate theoretical model that should, in 
principle, provide a precise insight into how the sub-indicators contribute to the underlying 
composite phenomenon.
2  Indeed, one often observes that an agreement emerges about the 
choice  of  key  sub-indicators  (though  we concede  that  it  may  take time  to  reach  such an 
agreement).  But  while  there  is  a  broad  consent  that  all  these  single  indicators  can  be 
‘associated with’ the comprehensive phenomenon at hand, the hard question remains how and 
by how much.  
In this paper, we therefore consider this lack of consensus as a GHILQLQJSURSHUW\ of 
(the new) composite indicators.  As one important purpose of such indicators is to serve as a 
basis of comparison, with other geographical entities or over time, the natural question that 
follows is to what extent one can coherently employ them for such purpose.  To clarify our 
general  position  on  this  issue  further,  we  note  that  the  uncertainty  about  the  appropriate 
aggregation of sub-indicators carries over to the underlying phenomenon itself, as captured by 
a  composite  measure.    And  as  far  as  the  latter  is  concerned,  we  fully  concur  with  the 
recommendation  that  “if  a  concept  has  some  basic  ambiguity  (…),  then  a  SUHFLVH 
representation of that ambiguous concept must SUHVHUYHthat ambiguity, rather than try to 
remove it through some arbitrary complete ordering.” (Foster and Sen, 1997, p. 121, italics in 
original).  Urging for a representation which is precise and still preserves ambiguity is only 
seemingly contradictory: in some cases, including –in our opinion-  the one in the current 
paper,  one  may  use  a  well-defined  aggregation  PHWKRG  that  incorporates  the  doubts 
intertwined with the aggregation SUREOHP.   
For sure, there is no recipe for building composite indicators that is at the same time 
universally applicable and sufficiently detailed.  The nature and quality of the underlying raw 
data, the availability and the heterogeneity of expert opinion, the specific purposes for which 
such an index is intended, etc., all (should) feed back into the construction of a composite 
indicator.  In this sense, we think that the method discussed in this paper is particularly suited 
for  cases  (a)  in  which  the  underlying  purpose  is  to  get  some  idea  of  the  composite 
‘performance dynamics’ of, say, a country relative to other countries, and, (b) where expert 
                                                
2 Thus, whereas the traditional indices are not totally free of criticism either, the scientific assessment of their 
merits and demerits as composite indicators notably goes back to an analysis of their underlying ZHOOGHILQHG
theoretical framework.  Similarly, one could say that the public acceptance of such indices is fostered by the 
broad (scientific) acceptance of the theories from which they are derived.     5 
opinion about the proper weights for merging the sub-indicators is available but disparate.   
As we explain in section 2, the European Commission’s efforts to monitor the development of 
its Internal Market provide a good illustration of such a context. 
Notwithstanding  their  context-dependency,  composite  indicators  ideally  meet  some 
minimal conditions of index theory.   The primary concern here is the aforementioned issue 
that the original data may have no common meaningful measurement unit.  We discuss this 
issue in section 3.  However, as we also explain in that section, index theory alone does not 
usually suffice to provide a complete characterization of the composite indicator.  One still 
has to face the weighting issue.  We explain why equal weighting  –a normal  practice in 
composite indicator construction– is fundamentally flawed, and show how similar points can 
be raised against ‘exact’ weighting schemes that are uniformly applied to all observations.    
In section 4 we propose to aggregate the data with an HQGRJHQRXVZHLJKWLQJprocedure.  
In brief, this procedure generates weights that comply with the limited expert consensus, but 
deal with the remaining uncertainty using an impartial ‘benefit-of-the-doubt’ approach (after 
Melyn  and Moesen,  1991).   Adhering  to  such an  approach  entails  that  discussions  about 
‘arbitrary orderings’ or ‘imposed value judgements’, e.g. by the concerned country’s policy 
makers, are likely to be minimized.   
The  proposed  method  has  been  used  for  composite  indicators  previously  (see  e.g. 
Cherchye HWDO., 2004, and the references cited therein), but the focus in these applications 
was on cross-section benchmarking of countries.  Here we want to highlight its usefulness for 
panel data.  Specifically, in section 5 we demonstrate how the method may be used to check 
to what extent a country’s better performance over time is, relative to other countries in the 
sample, a result of genuine progress rather than a catching-up effect.  We illustrate this type of 
analysis  with  the  data  the  European  Commission  uses  to  track  the  effects  of  its  Internal 
Market Policy.  The latter is specifically geared towards LPSURYLQJ economic performance
hence dynamically oriented performance evaluation seems particularly suited in this context. 
Section 6 gathers the main points. In addition, it offers some concluding remarks and 
suggests avenues for further research. 
 
 7KH(XURSHDQ&RPPLVVLRQ¶V,QWHUQDO0DUNHW,QGH[
Free movement of people, goods, services and capital within the European Union has been on 
the agenda ever since the Treaty of Rome, but the actual implementation of that principle is 
an ongoing process.   A major actor in this domain is the European Commission’s Internal 
Market Directorate-General, which is above all charged with removing (legal) barriers to free   6 
movement.  In addition, it also informs citizens and businesses about the rights and benefits 
they are entitled to in the Single Market.  One of its information vehicles is the Internal 
Market Scoreboard. Twice a year, this Scoreboard offers a picture of the current state of the 
Single  Market,  and  gauges  the  degree  to  which  member  states,  the  Council  and  the 
Commission are meeting various Internal Market targets (e.g. the pace of transposition of 
European directives to national legislation, development of harmonized standards, etc.). 
In 2001, the Internal Market Scoreboard introduced the ‘Internal Market Index’ (IMI).  
From its inception, the basic purpose of the IMI has been to track progress on the Internal 
Market strategy, by looking at a combination of several outcome-variables.  After the first 
IMI was presented with a word of caution, a substantially revised and improved IMI was 
presented in the November 2002 special issue of the Internal Market Scoreboard.  Its basic 
structure has been unaffected since then.  We provide a short account of its construction here, 
and refer to two methodological reports of the European Commission’s Joint Research Centre 
for an in-depth treatment (Tarantola HWDO, 2002, Tarantola HWDO., 2004) 
To begin with, in view of our remarks in the Introduction it is noteworthy that the 
substantive content of the IMI has always been downplayed by its authors.  They have ever 
been the first to stress that the reality of the Internal Market is too complex to be summarized 
in a single number, and even after the release of the improved version, their modest claim was 
that it “should be seen more as a reality check than as a precise scientific exercise” (European 
Commision-Internal Market Directorate General, 2002, p. 38)  
That statement surely must be qualified, as one can definitely not say that the IMI is 
constructed haphazardly. On the contrary, throughout its creation process the IMI’s authors 
built on statistical, economic and analytical expertise, and an extensive peer review backup by 
stakeholders such as Eurostat and the Internal Market Advisory Committee (IMAC, i.e. the 
group of Member State officials which the Commission consults on Internal Market matters; 
see also below). 
The IMI’s sub-indicators all capture different aspects through which the effects of the 
Internal  Market  are  taken  to  materialize.    In  general  terms,  these  are  gauges  for  the 
elimination of barriers to free movement of production factors and final goods, and for its 
alleged downward effects on prices in some key markets.  All together, twelve sub-indicators 
were selected.  The raw data are expressed in different measurement units such as GDP-shares, 
prices in euro, population percentages, etc. Specifically, these twelve sub-indicators are (i) 
sectoral and ad hoc state aid (% of GDP), (ii) the share of published public procurement (% of 
GDP), (iii) telecommunication costs (in euro), (iv) electricity prices (in euro),  (v) gas prices   7 
(in  euro),  (vi)  countries’  relative  price  level  (PPP/market  exchange  rate),  (vii)  Intra-EU 
foreign direct investment  (% of GDP), (viii) Intra-EU trade (% of GDP), (ix) the ratio of 
retail lending and savings interest rates, (x) the share of a country’s active population coming 
from other member states, (xi) postal tariffs (in euro), and (xii) the value of pension funds 
assets (% of GDP).
3  Table 1 provides some summary statistics for the two years we will 
consider in more detail further on.  The table also indicates whether a rise in the concerned 
indicator is taken to be good (+) or bad (-) in terms of the desirable internal market effects. An 
important  feature  of  Table  1  is  the  disparate  trends  in  the  sub-indicators.  All  favourable 
indicators increase, but to very different degrees. Some unfavourable indicators decline, while 
others increase. This disparity in the performance of sub-indicators highlights the importance 




























1994                         
EU-15 average  1,67  1,28  16,61  147793  157549  100  0,83  13,80  0,0137  18,90  2,56  0,45 
Member States : 
 sample std.dev  0,81  1,23  8,59  27454  55889  17,02  1,17  10,02  0,01  23,35  2,26  0,42 
                         
2000                         
EU-15 average  0,78  2,41  5,14  129164  210368  100  7,97  17,80  0,0145  28,70  3,61  0,53 
Member States : 
 sample std.dev  0,49  0,92  1,86  26021,33  36889,52  16,01  5,32  13,87  0,01  36,50  3,03  0,44 
Note: StA: sectoral and ad hoc state aid, PuP: value of published public procurement, Tel: 
telecommunication costs, Elec: electricity prices, Gas: gas prices, RPL: countries’ relative 
price level, FDI: Intra-EU Foreign Direct Investment, Trade: Intra-EU trade, Pop: share of a 
country’s active population coming from other member states, Pens: value of pension funds 
assets, Intrst: ratio of retail lending and savings interest rates, Post: postal tariffs.   

The next steps in the IMI’s construction are (i) a rescaling of the raw data so that they 
are  all  expressed  in  a  common  measurement  unit,  and  (ii)  the  actual  construction  of  the 
composite value, which is a weighted sum of the rescaled sub-indicators.  Both features will 
be taken up in more detail in section 3 and section 4 respectively.  Yet it is instructive to note 
at this point that the IMI is QRW a sum of HTXDOO\ZHLJKWHG (rescaled) sub-indicators.  In fact, 
                                                
3 See Tarantola HWDO (2004) for an exact definition, data sources, and an explanation of the way in which these 
indicators capture policy targets and effects of market integration. Note that we take the interest rate indicator 
(Intrst) as it was defined in the 2002 report; in 2004 one switched to taking the GLIIHUHQFH between lending and 
savings rates. The original IMI was based on 20 sub-indicators, but the number was reduced after consultation of 
Internal Market experts and following a quality control check according to Eurostat guidelines.  Tarantola HWDO. 
(2002) provide an account of the statistical quality of the original data and a principal component analysis to 
justify the use of these twelve indicators.    8 
these weights are derived from a survey in which individual members of the Internal Market 
Advisory Committee were asked to forward their weighting scheme.  Table 2, taken from 
Tarantola HWDO(2002), displays the weights as they were provided by IMAC-members along 
with some summary statistics.  The actual IMI’s weights are the averages shown in bold.  A 
quick glance at Table 2 reveals that the Member States’ experts differ quite substantially on 
how they view the most appropriate weighting scheme.
4  The table thus clearly illustrates our 
central  theme  that  differing  expert  opinions  are  a  key  constituent  of  many  composite 
indicators. 
    
7DEOH,0$&PHPEHUV¶SURSRVHGZHLJKWVIRUWKHVXELQGLFDWRUVRI,0,
  StA  PuP  Tel  Elec  Gas  RPL  FDI  Trade  Pop  Pens  Intrst  Post 
AT  10  0  15  15  15  20  15  10  0  0  0  0 
BE  0  25  10  20  15  0  10  10  10  0  0  0 
DE  20  20  0  5  0  0  20  20  5  0  10  0 
DK  30  0  10  10  10  15  0  0  0  0  15  10 
ES  15  10  10  15  10  0  15  25  0  0  0  0 
FI  10  0  10  20  10  0  15  20  0  0  15  0 
FR  0  10  15  20  10  25  0  0  0  0  10  10 
GR  20  18  8  4  0  20  15  15  0  0  0  0 
IE  20  10  15  15  10  0  10  20  0  0  0  0 
IT  30  35  10  15  0  0  10  0  0  0  0  0 
NL  10  20  0  0  2  8  20  20  20  0  0  0 
PT  0  15  5  15  10  15  20  20  0  0  0  0 
SE  15  15  15  15  0  15  0  15  10  0  0  0 
UK  10  10  10  0  0  20  20  20  0  10  0  0 
                          Average             
Max  30  35  15  20  15  25  20  25  20  10  15  10 
Min  0  0  0  0  0  0  0  0  0  0  0  0 
# 0  3  3  2  2  5  6  3  3  10  13  10  12 
Median  12,5  12,5  10  15  10  11,5  15  17,5  0  0  0  0 
Stdev  9,5  9,6  4,8  6,8  5,7  9,3  7,2  8,3  5,9  2,6  5,8  3,5 
Var-coef  0,7  0,7  0,5  0,6  0,9  0,9  0,6  0,6  1,8  3,6  1,6  2,4 
Note: StA: sectoral and ad hoc state aid, PuP: value of published public procurement, Tel: 
telecommunication costs, Elec: electricity prices, Gas: gas prices, RPL: countries’ relative 
price level, FDI: Intra-EU Foreign Direct Investment, Trade: Intra-EU trade, Pop: share of a 
country’s active population coming from other member states, Pens: value of pension funds 
assets, Intrst: difference between retail lending and savings interest rates, Post: postal tariffs.  




                                                
4 The expert weights that are closest to the average, as measured by the sum of squared residuals, are those of the 
Irish IMAC-member.  Table 2 reveals that this can hardly be considered as a strong agreement.  Some expert 
weights are similar in terms of correlation (the maximal value being 0.93 for Spain and Ireland), but there are 
many cases where this weight correlation is negative as well (the minimum is -0.47, between France and the 
Netherlands).    The maximum  and  minimum  UDQN correlations are  0.83  and -0.50.   In  70%  of  all  pairwise 
comparisons, the hypothesis that there is no significant relationship between sub-indicator rankings cannot be 
rejected at the 5%-level.     9 
Eventually, the IMI is typically published as a line graph connecting ‘EU-15 point 
values’ for each year.  The first, base-year value is set at 100, so implicitly advancing the 
message that these genuinely are index numbers in the way commonly understood.  In fact, 
the companion methodological note is very specific about this interpretation, stating that “if a 
country has an IMI value of 120 for a given year, this implies that the country performs 20% 
better than its own state in [the base year]” (Tarantola HWDO2002, p. 3). 
Two final remarks are in order.  First, similar FRXQWU\VSHFLILF IMI values can be (and 
have been) calculated, tracking a country’s progress over time, where the country itself serves 
as its proper yardstick. In sections 4 and 5, we also focus on country-specific internal market 
performance, including inter-temporal performance shifts, but our indices will be based on 
panel data analysis. Second, the ‘point values’ have actually been checked with sensitivity 
and uncertainty analysis.  For example, the weights in Table 2 were used in a Monte Carlo 
analysis to construct confidence intervals for the point estimates per year (Tarantola HWDO
2002, pp. 20-25). Sensitivity and uncertainty analysis will not be the central focus in this 
paper.  This does not mean that we consider either of them as unimportant for composite 
indicators.    Quite  the  reverse:  it  follows  from  our  discussion  that  composite  indicator 
construction is entirely permeated with uncertainties.   However, it is a truism that one must 
have some  specific base model before  robustness assessments can be  sensibly conducted.   
From this perspective, the point to be developed in the next sections is that such a specific 
model can already capture much of the uncertainty surrounding composite indicators.    We 
will return to sensitivity and uncertainty issues in the concluding section. 
    
 
 0HDVXULQJ,QWHUQDO0DUNHWSHUIRUPDQFH
In his discussion of the Human Development Index, Desai (1994, p. 34-35) defines 
the measurement problem in economics as one of “reducing a vector of variables to a scalar” 
by means of a weighted sum. It is however clear that several other aggregator functions exist 
to perform such a reduction.  A more general description of the generic measurement problem 
is therefore that it addresses the interdependency of quantitatively meaningful representations 
of “raw data” on the one hand, and the precise method of aggregating these representations 
into a scalar on the other hand (see e.g. Aczél, 1988).  
One important building block in such a setting is the scale (ordinal, cardinal, …) used 
as  a  numerical  representation  for  each  of  the  LQGLYLGXDO  sub-indicators.    Each  scale  is 
associated  with  a  set  of  admissible  transformations,  which  in  turn  define  what  kind  of   10 
numerical statements are meaningful. For example, if one observes that the price for sending a 
standard letter is twice as high in France as in Germany, then this remains true regardless of 
the currency in which both prices are denominated. The other sub-indicators may be classified 
according  to  their  (possibly  different)  measurement  scales  as  well.  The  point  is  then  to 
examine what kind of aggregator function can be applied to a given set of sub-indicators, and 
what  kind  of  meaningful  statements  can  be  associated  with  the  ‘aggregate  values’  this 
function  produces.    Of  course,  the  reasoning  also  holds  the  reverse  way:  particular 
aggregation methods presuppose particular measure-theoretic qualities of the original data in 
order to be meaningful.  This measurement perspective is important for composite indicator 
construction as well (Munda and Nardo, 2003; Ebert and Welsch, 2004): one can expect a 
strong  link  between  the  ‘normalisation’  problem  (“sub-indicators  have  no  common 
meaningful measurement unit”) and the ‘aggregation problem’ (“there is no obvious way of 
weighting these sub-indicators”) with which such indices have to cope.  
Turning to the IMI-case, what does one want to measure if one is interested in the 
aggregate performance dynamics of a multi-dimensional phenomenon such as the Internal 
Market?  We take it that part of the answer is contained in the quote that “if a country has an 
IMI value of 120 for a given year, this implies that the country performs 20% better than its 
own state in [the base year]”.   Put differently, we take it that the purpose of the IMI is to 
convey a reasonable statement about the “average performance growth” of the set of sub-
indicators,  just  as  e.g.  the  CPI’s  purpose  is  to  depict  the  (appropriately  defined)  average 
growth of the price level between a base year and another moment in time. This immediately 




First, the previous remarks do suggest an appropriate normalisation of the raw data, 







          (1a), 
where 
￿
￿ \  ¹ 0 is the base value for the L-th sub-indicator and 
1
￿ \  its value at time ‘1’. Such 
normalisation is indeed an admissible transformation of our raw data: it is meaningful to say, 
for example, that Portugal’s Intra EU-Trade has increased by a factor 1.99 between 1994 and 
2000, that the share of Denmark’s non-Danish (EU citizens) active population has almost   11 
doubled between 1994 and 2001, etc. Moreover, (and with a little extra notation we provide in 
section 5), a normalization such as (1a) is also meaningful for comparisons between countries 
as well as for ‘panel’ comparisons (‘Germany’s 2000 public procurement share of GDP was 
in fact less than one fifth of Greece’s corresponding value in 1994’).  Note that higher ratios 
are taken to represent beneficial internal market effects in each of these examples. Yet this 
does not hold for all sub-indicators (e.g. the postal tariffs discussed above).  In such cases 







          (1b), 
 
 to convey statements such as “sending a standard letter in Denmark in 1992 was almost four 
times cheaper than sending the same letter in Austria in 2000”. In our IMI-application below, 
both (1a) and (1b) are therefore used as normalised versions of the raw data.   
 
% $JJUHJDWLRQWKHZHLJKWLQJLVVXH
There are also some formal desiderata that one would like to see incorporated by the 
aggregator, i.e. the composite indicator used to gauge ‘average growth’.  For instance, one 
would indeed like to see the IMI increase by [percent if, ceteris paribus, all the sub-indicators 
have  increased  by  [ percent;  that  a  base-year  value  of  100  has  a  clear  meaning,  etc. 
Specifically, we propose to focus on gauges that are similar to output distance functions.  The 
latters’ axiomatic properties have been well-documented in the literature (e.g. Shephard, 1970; 
Balk, 1998), and some of these properties are indeed desirable for the composite indicator 
problem  at  hand.  For  example,  an  output  distance  function  is  weakly  monotonic, 
homogeneous of degree +1 and convex in sub-indicators, and bounded above by unity, which 
corresponds to best practice. 
At this point, we may paraphrase the opening quote of this paper by insisting that the 
act  of  measurement  itself  has  a  theoretical  underpinning  that  cannot  be  neglected  with 
impunity when constructing composite indicators. But it is also clear that measurement (or 
index number) theory alone is not sufficient to identify ‘the’ suitable composite indicator.  For 
composite  indicators  in  particular,  one  still  has  to  cope  with  the  inherent  difficulty  that 
experts’ opinions about the relative importance of each sub-indicator in such an index are 
usually quite disparate.    
 In fact, some parallels can be drawn with the illustrious ‘measurement without theory’ 
discussion in index number theory.   Recall that price (or quantity) index theory is developed   12 
from three different angles.  First, the axiomatic approach forwards desirable properties upon 
which suitable index numbers are derived.  Second, the stochastic approach starts from the 









￿is a random variable, i.e. an estimate of 
inflation which can itself be found by averaging over these ratios (e.g. Selvanathan and Rao, 
1994).  Finally, the so-called economic perspective, introduced by Könus (1924), traditionally 
disavowed the former two strands as ‘measurement without theory’.
5   
To briefly explain the parallel, assume everyone would agree that expression (1a) is a 
fitting way to measure the performance dynamics of each separate sub-indicator.  Then let us 
take a stochastic perspective by stating that all the numbers so derived are in fact estimates of 
the common internal market performance growth rate g.  To take two particular examples, one 
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1 ,  in  both  cases  with  the  error  terms  independently  and 
symmetrically  distributed.    The  former  assumption  eventually  leads  to  the  ‘Jevonian’  g-
estimator (2a), whereas the latter variant leads to a ‘Carli’-type index (2b)



























1 1 ˆ g .        (2b) 
The key criticism that has historically been raised against indices (2a) and (2b) is that 
all observed sub-indicator growth rates are taken to be equally important in calculating the 
underlying  common  growth  rate.
7     In  particular,  the  economic  approach  to  price  index 
numbers  has  carried  this  argument  further  by  insisting  that  prices  and  their  weights  (i.e. 
consumed  or  produced  quantities)  in  a  price  index  number  are  in  fact  connected  YLD  the 
underlying (hypothesized model of) optimizing behaviour of the economic agent(s) concerned.  
A quick glance at existing composite indicators reveals that a large majority of them 
are  of  the  equal  weighting  type.    Somewhat  surprisingly  then,  the  weighting  scheme 
disavowed  for  economic  indexes  such  as  (2a)  and  (2b)  is  quite  common  for  composite 
indicators.  Among other authors, Babbie (1995, p. 171) goes so far as to recommend it TXD
                                                
5 Further references can e.g. be found in the contributions of Diewert collected in Diewert and Nakamura (1993). 
6 If one replaces the sub-indicators \
- by prices, expression (2a) is the price-index as proposed by Jevons (1865) 
while (2b) is the Carli (1804) price index. 
7 Even from a purely stochastic perspective, this point makes sense: if, by way of example, the sub-indicators are 
output prices (as in a CPI), and if we were to draw sub-indicators at random to provide an estimate of the 
common inflation rate, clearly not all of them have an equal chance of being selected. As argued by Theil (1967), 
the probability in this specific case is rather given by the revenue share of the good concerned.  One particular 
expenditure-weighted version of expression (2a) is indeed known as the Theil-Törnqvist index.   13 
standard,  stating  that  “items  be  weighted  equally  unless  there  are  compelling  reasons  for 
differential weighting.  That is, the burden of the proof should be on differential weighting; 
equal weighting should be the norm”.     
This obviously provides no substantive justification for equal weighting.    Neither, we 
think, does the appeal to Occam’s razor by Hopkins (1991, p. 1471): “Since it is probably 
impossible to obtain agreement  on weights, the simplest arrangement is the best choice.”   
The reason why the principle of parsimony provides no guidance here is important: opting for 
equal weighting does not imply choosing from a set of RWKHUZLVHHTXLYDOHQW models of a given 
phenomenon.  In fact, as exemplified by Table 2, the problem is rather that there are, at best, 
conflictingopinions available.  Hence, equal weighting is not even an adequate GHVFULSWLRQ of 
the core debate in composite indicator construction.
8   
 The IMI’s construction illustrates how differential weighting is often introduced: a 
group of experts is consulted and the weight information they provide is aggregated, usually 
by  averaging.    This  means  that  one  uses  the  experts’  weight  information  to  arrive  at  an 
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where  the  weight 
2 Z  for  a  sub-indicator  is  the  sample  average  of  the  experts’  proposed 
valuations.  Thus, the observed opinions are considered as a particular sample to which the 
laws of probability can be applied.   However, if the experts are truly experts, i.e. when each 
one of them is endowed with a profound knowledge of the phenomena under consideration, 
one has to come to grips with the deep problem that “decision makers who wish to base 
choices on the advice of the panel have no way to objectively assign probabilities to the 
alternatives”  (Woodward  and  Bishop,  1997,  p.  494).    Or,  with  reference  to  the  IMI-
application: can the Commission consider the weights given to postal tariffs by the Danish 
                                                
8 Moreover,  as  already  touched  upon,  equal  weighting  as  a  rule  interferes  with  the  specific  preliminary 
normalization process.  For examples, see e.g. Panigrami and Sivramkrishna (2002) or Cherchye HWDO. (2004).  
This means that, at best, equal weighting is only apparently the simplest arrangement.    
9 The closest analogue to this formula in standard index theory is the ‘Lowe quantity index’ (after Lowe, 1823): 




.  The 
corresponding Lowe price index (with a fixed quantity basket) is often used in applied calculations, e.g. of 
monthly price indices.  Note however that in such cases the fixed basket is ultimately taken from direct market 
REVHUYDWLRQV,  whereas  in  the  composite  indicator  case  the  fixed  weights  stem  from  some  aggregation  over 
individual expert RSLQLRQV.      14 
and French experts as ‘less SUREDEOH’, just because these experts hold a minority position?
 10  
This issue is likely to gain importance in cases where opinions may be disparate (think of 
Table 2).   
Finally,  even  if  experts  themselves  perform  the  mental  act  of  providing  the  right 
objective,  H[SODQDWRU\  weights,  at  least  part  of  the  purpose  of  the  composite  indicator  is 
QRUPDWLYH:  it  does  eventually  determine  the  countries’  benchmarks.    Clearly,  when  even 
experts disagree, there is a flavour of strong value judgements present if one sees countries’ 
vaguely  describable  reality  about  ‘the’  internal  market  effects  (or  another  composite 
phenomenon) being rigidly weighted and transformed into an exact number.  
In short, we think that agreement on DQ\ particular common set of weights, whether 
that is the equal weight set or another one, is usually a mirage, and to depict it as such is 
therefore  LQWULQVLFDOO\  problematic.    However,  this  still  need  not  imply  that  building 
reasonable  composite  indicators  is  impossible.    We  address  the  weighting  issue  in  the 
following section.  The proposed methodology will be used afterwards to construct an index 




Foster and Sen (1997, p. 206) asserted that “[w]hile the possibility of arriving at a 
unique set of weights is rather unlikely, that uniqueness is not really necessary to make agreed 
judgments in many situations.”  The aggregation method we employ in this section can be 
taken as an illustration of this idea.  Basically, the idea is to apply the experts’ stated weight 
vectors as constraints in a weight optimization problem that seeks to maximize aggregate 
performance for each particular observation.  Hence, for each observation, the weights leading 
up to its index value are to some degree HQGRJHQRXV, the degree of endogeneity depending on 
the extent of disagreement within the expert panel.  Since for each observation the problem is 
formulated such as to yield the highest possible index value (given the weight constraints), 
this method has alternatively been labeled ‘benefit-of-the-doubt’-weighting (e.g. by Melyn 
and Moesen, 1991). 
                                                
10 According to Woodward and Bishop, the answer is unambiguously negative (1997, p. 494): “Since experts’ 
opinions vary because of underlying theories, in many circumstances the relative number of experts that hold a 
particular position tells us little about the likelihood that that perspective will be correct […] If the opinion of 
each expert is highly respected, then the inclusion of additional experts with opinions already represented on the 
panel should not be important to the decision process.”     15 
The  origins  of  this  procedure  are  found  in  so-called  non-parametric  performance 
analysis, or ‘data envelopment analysis’ (DEA) (see e.g. Cooper HWDO, 2004, for a recent 
overview of the vast DEA literature).   The original question in that literature was how one 
could measure each firm’s efficiency, given observations on input and output quantities in a 
sample of firms and, often, no reliable information on prices, in a setting where one has no 
knowledge about the ‘functional form’ of a production or cost function.  However broad, one 
immediately appreciates the conceptual similarity between that problem and the one in this 
paper, in which quantitative sub-indicators are available but weights are not.  Indeed, and 
unsurprisingly,  the  scope  of  DEA  has  broadened  considerably  over  the  last  two  decades, 
including LQWHUDOLD ‘macro’-assessments of countries’ productivity performance (e.g Kumar 
and Russell, 2002), and various applications to composite indicator construction (Cherchye HW
DO  2004,  provide  a  list  of  such  applications.  The  European  Commission  itself  uses  the 
method in its(8(FRQRP\5HYLHZ; see European Commission , 2004, p. 376-378).  
  The method is captured formally in expressions (3a) – (3c)
11. Note that (3a) is an 
aggregate of normalised variables of type (1a) only, i.e. we divide each 
5
6 \ , observation M’s 
value of sub-indicator L, by the corresponding base value 
7
8 \ for that sub-indicator. This is 
however only to facilitate presentation; type (1b) normalisations have been used wherever 
appropriate.  (As regards the base observation, we set 
9
: \  at the Lth sub-indicator’s 1992 
average value for the EU-15.)    
As (3a) reveals, the denominator of the index value, i.e. the benchmark observation 
value, is itself obtained from an optimization problem.  It is in fact the observation that, by 
employing the ‘most favorable weights’ for the HYDOXDWHG observation, yields the maximal 
weighted sum of all observations in the sample. Consequently, this benchmark is endogenous 
too.    Literally,  it  is  either  an  observation  that  demonstrably  outperforms  the  evaluated 
observation in terms of the latter’s most flattering weighting scheme or, if such a superior 
observation  does  not  exist,  the  evaluated  observation  serves  as  its  proper  benchmark
12.  
Clearly then, the benefit-of-the-doubt character of the comparisons extends to the choice of 
the benchmark. The full set of index values is found by repeating this optimization procedure 
for all Q observations.   
 
                                                
11 Note that this is a benefit-of-the-doubt weighted counterpart of the Jevonian quantity index (2a).  Essentially 
the same idea can be applied to the Carli-index (2b), starting from a log-transformation of the original data 
(compare with Charnes HWDO (1983), and Banker and Maindiratta (1986) in the original DEA-context). 
12 In the latter case, the index value is trivially set at 100.   16 
There are 12 sub-indicators that comprise the IMI, hence P=12 in (3a)-(3c). Next, we 
take Q=30 in the empirical illustrations of this section.  Specifically, we use data for the 14 
Member States listed in Table 2 plus the average data for the EU-15.  We confine ourselves 
here to observations for two years, YL]. 1994 and 2000.  Note further that in this section we 
pool all observations, regardless of the time period.  This implies, for instance, that country 
;’s index for 1994 can be calculated with country <’s aggregate performance in 2000 figuring 
in the denominator of (3a). Specifically, pooling implies an unaltered environment in both 
years  and  therefore  the  best  practices  are  also  assumed  the  same  in  both  periods.  This 
approach will be altered when explicitly dealing with dynamical aspects in section 5. Our 
primary attention is here on the weighting issue, as captured in (3b) and (3c).  
Formally,  for  country/year  j  under  evaluation,  the  benefit-of-the-doubt  weighting 
problem is to select weights Z





















































E ,..., 1 : 100





æ å =           (3b) 
G
5 : + Í Î ) ,.., ,.., ( 1
H
I Z Z Z             (3c) 
As problem (3a) – (3c) is a weight selection problem for an individual observation M, and since 
we have 30 observations (14 countries plus a mean country, each for two years), the problem 
will be solved 30 times. Accordingly, we get 30 scores, one for each country in each year, and 
one for the EU-15 mean in each year.  
Expression  (3b)  reveals  that  the  weighted  sum  of  the  normalised  sub-indicators  is 
constrained to be at most 100, and, in fact, this implies that the endogenous benchmark value 
is  normalised  at  that  ‘100%’-value.    Note  that  this  goes  against  a  common  practice  in 
composite  indicator  construction,  where  as  a  rule  the  weights  themselves  are  directly 
restricted to add up to one.   However, the latter approach is superfluous, and may even be 
misleading: since (3b) is a linear value function, any ordering of Qdifferent Pvectors of sub-
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M
M Z ).   Stated  differently:  what   17 
matters in the linear composite are the relative weights (i.e. the 
N
O Z Z / - , which directly refer 
to the substitutability of the different dimensions) rather than the absolute weights. Of course, 
by the same rule, nothing prohibits presenting the optimal endogenous weights HYHQWXDOO\ in 
the form å ) /(
* *
P
P Z Z , and we will adhere to that presentation of the weights below. But this 
should  not  obscure  the  essential  idea  that  the  resulting  benefit-of-the-doubt  ‘number’  is 
expressed UHODWLYH to a base value of 100%.   To recall, this base value is associated with the 
(best practice) bechmark for the evaluated observation.  While eventually this is a matter of 
normalisation,  the  attractiveness  of  this  particular  choice  in  a  setting  characterised  by 
uncertainty should be clear.  In point of fact, given the limited information one can (and does) 
incorporate, the very concept of a best practice is itself necessarily relative and observation-
specific.  (Indeed, if there would be universal agreement about what constitutes best practice, 
then  one  KDV  unanimous  agreement  about  a  base  value,  and  country  indices  could  be 
calculated by measuring the distance to this ‘absolute’ reference point).  
Finally, the weight restrictions as defined in (3c) serve the objective of limiting the 
variation  in  the  relative  importance  of  the  sub-indicators  reflected  in  the  experts’  stated 
opinions.    In  general,  there  are  many  different  ways  in  which  ‘value  judgments’  can  be 
appended to the benefit-of-the-doubt procedure (see e.g. Thanassoulis HWDO., 2004, for an 
overview). The alternatives we single out below do certainly not exhaust the full range of 
possibilities  and  should  therefore  be  seen  as  illustrative  examples  of  possible  “agreed 
judgments”, tailored to the IMI example. 
 
$2UGLQDOZHLJKWERXQGVRQPXWXDOO\DJUHHGFDWHJRULHV
Looking back at table 2, one sees that several sub-indicators can be grouped under 
more general headings.  For instance: it seems reasonable to say that the first two indicators 
relate to ‘governmental barriers’, that several indicators are concerned with specific market 
prices, and so on.   Specifically, let us assume by way of example that experts commonly 
agree that the full set of 12 indicators can be subdivided in the following 5 categories (the 
explanation for the abbreviations is found under table 2): 
  I.  ‘Governmental barriers’: {StA, Pup} 
  II.  ‘Prices’: {Tel, Elec, Gas, Intrst, Post} 
III.  ‘Free movement’: {FDI, Trade, Pop} 
IV.  Countries’ general price level, relative to the EU-average {RPL} 
V.  Pension funds assets {Pens}   18 
From table 3, which is based on the accordingly categorized data of table 2, one can 
infer that the average ‘group weights’ I-III are close to each other.  Also, although some 
individuals’  judgments  are  still  relatively  distinct,  the  coefficients  of  variation  for  the  so 
constructed groups are low in comparison with the original partition (IV and V are of course 
the same as columns RPL and Pens in table 2). 
 
 7DEOH6XPPDU\VWDWLVWLFVRQJURXSHGVXELQGLFDWRUVRI,QWHUQDO0DUNHW3HUIRUPDQFH
  Categories 
  I  II  III  IV  V 
Average      
Max  65  65  60  25  10 
Min  10  2  0  0  0 
# 0  0  0  2  6  13 
Median  27,5  32,5  30  11,5  0 
Stdev  14,2  18,3  16,2  9,3  2,6 
Var-coef  0,5  0,6  0,6  0,9  3,6 
 
Let us next assume that the experts, after agreeing on the composition of the different 







In formal terms, this implies that expression (3c) can be specialized to the following 
set  of  weight  restrictions:  å å å å å
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Imputing these constraints and solving (3a) – (3c) for our pooled sample leads to the 
results displayed partly in table 4.  (These are results for the 1994 observations only.  The 
index values for 2000 are at least as high for all countries, a feature that we will discuss in 
more detail further on.)    Table 4 thus shows that ‘limited expert consensus’, as defined 
above, can still lead to composite index values: the remaining uncertainties are in fact taken at 
face  value  as  the  ‘absence  of  further  restrictions’.  The  remaining  leeway  granted  to  the   19 
evaluated observation is filled in by the impartial benefit-of-the-doubt weighting procedure.   
Indeed, the weights in table 4 all comply with the preceding broad value judgment, but one 
sees that it can be satisfied differently in order to arrive at a composite index.
13   
As  regards  the  specific  index  values,  we  confine  ourselves  in  this  (a-temporal) 
exercise  to  single  out  two  notable  cases.    First,  it  may  be  surprising  that  one  finds  both 
Sweden and Greece to achieve the highest possible index value.  Sweden’s result is less of a 
surprise: it performs good or excellent in several categories (e.g. published procurement, the 
intra EU-trade and human mobility variable, interest rates,…). However, Greece’s favourable 
result  is  largely  due  to  one  sub-indicator,  viz.  its  share  of  published  public  procurement 
(5.27%  of  GDP).  Relative  to  the  corresponding  values  of  other  observations,  this can  be 
regarded as an outlier (the second highest value being 3.81% for the UK in 2000). Here we 
take  the  position  that  this  outlier  value  indeed  reveals  (observed)  best  practice  in  the 
concerned dimension and therefore conveys valuable information for relative performance 
analysis. We return briefly to the correction for outliers (notably when they can be due to 
measurement error) in the concluding section.  Second, for sake of clarity we recall that the 
value for EU-15 in table 4 is not the average of individual country scores. Rather, it is the 
score of the average of the individual country category values. 
Note that the discriminatory power of a benefit-of-the-doubt approach is rather high, 
despite  the  very  modest  nature  of  the  weight  restrictions  associated  with  judgement  ‘O’.  
Indeed, if we were to drop these restrictions,  a ‘full’ benefit-of-the-doubt approach would 
effectively  allow  for  considerably  more  leeway  in  the  selection  of  observation-specific 
weights and, a fortiori, in the calculation of an index value. To show this, we added in the 
rightmost column the index values that would result if the only extra constraint added to (3a)-
(3b) were that all sub-indicator weights have to be equal or larger than zero.  The statement 
0 ,.., ,.., 1 ³
v
w Z Z Z  would then capture the most limited kind of possible consensus among the 
experts, viz. that each of the 12 sub-indicators PD\be used to construct a composite indicator 
to assess a country’s internal market performance. Thus, when countries are given unlimited 
freedom to choose their own (nonnegative) weights, their choice of relatively idiosyncratic 
weights generates uniformly high unconstrained index values, and discriminatory power is 
sacrificed. This illustrates the trade-off between freedom to choose and discriminatory power.   
                                                
13 Judgment ‘O’ is defined on categories rather than at the level of the sub-indicators.  Hence, even countries that 
share the same weights in table 3 may in fact mutually differ as regards the choice of weights ZLWKLQ a category. 
For instance, the VXPof theweights in category I equals 0.25 for seven countries in 1994, but at the more 
disaggregated level these values range from (0.01, 0.24) for Austria and France to (0.06, 0.19) for Belgium.   
Similar ‘permissible disagreements’ are found within categories II and III.   20 
 
7DEOH,0,VIRUFRPSO\LQJZLWKH[SHUWV¶FRPPRQMXGJPHQWµ2¶
  Weights per category    ,QGH[
9DOXH   I  II  III  IV  V 
XQFRQVWUDLQHG 
,QGH[9DOXH 
AT     25.0  25.0  25.0  25.0  0.0   
BE     25.0  25.0  25.0  25.0  0.0   
DE     30.7  30.7  30.7  7.9  0.0   
DK     29.8  29.8  29.8  10.5  0.0   
ES     24.0  24.0  24.0  24.0  4.0   
FI     25.0  25.0  25.0  25.0  0.0   
FR     25.0  25.0  25.0  25.0  0.0   
GR     33.3  33.3  33.3  0.0  0.0   
IE     24.0  24.0  24.0  24.0  4.0   
IT     25.0  25.0  25.0  25.0  0.0   
NL     24.4  24.4  24.4  2.4  0.0   
PT     25.0  25.0  25.0  25.0  0.0   
SE     33.3  33.3  33.3  0.0  0.0   
UK     24.4  24.4  24.4  2.4  0.0   




As discussed earlier, relative weights rather than absolute weights are important for 
the method described in equations (3a)-(3c).
 14  In principle, this means that each expert’s 
weight vector can be transformed into a corresponding P´ Prelative weight matrix, and that 
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~ H H , would then be given by the corresponding 
minimum and maximum values over all experts.  The eventual result would be benefit-of-the-
doubt index values of which the associated relative weights are, by construction, never set 
outside the limits as provided by the expert panel.  
In reality, these limits can be quite extreme, and the specific IMI weight set displayed 
in table 2 is a notable example of this.  For the IMI, every sub-indicator is granted a zero 
weight by at least one of the experts, and therefore applying this procedure would not lead to 
a truly ‘restricted’ optimization problem.
15     Zero minimum weights are (slightly) less of a 
                                                
14 For composite indicator construction in general, this fact has not gone unnoticed.  In particular, the Analytic 
Hierarchy Process (Saaty, 1980), which typically builds on relative weights, has been suggested as one method 
for deriving weights (see e.g. the website referred to in the main text).  However, contrary to the IMI case, AHP 
weights are typically picked from a 1 to 9 semantic pair-wise comparison scale (e.g. “1” means that the two 
attributes are “equally important”, “3” that one is “weakly more important” than the other, etc.).    
15 Strictly speaking, relative weights are undefined if the denominator is zero, but in the IMI example one could 
sidestep this by letting the trade-off value go to infinity in such cases.  This option would effectively imply that 
the weight set :in (3c) coincides with the non-negative orthant of 5
￿ .  Trivial as it may seem, such a model at 
least captures the limited consensus that LV undeniablypresent in the IMI-case, YL] the unanimous agreement that   21 
problem at the level of the categories defined above (cf. table 3).  The Appendix shows in 
more detail how the just outlined procedure can be applied at the category level.      
The second example we present can be conceived of as being intermediate between 
judgement “(O)” and the ‘min-max’-approach just discussed: it loosens the strict indifference 
between the three first categories, and appends numerical upper and lower trade-off bounds 
between these and the other categories.   Suppose that experts would agree on the following 
broad judgment, which we describe first in qualitative terms, but which is clearly inspired by 







ZRUVH SHUIRUPDQFH LQ D FRXQWU\¶V JHQHUDO SULFH OHYHO FDWHJRU\ ,9 EXW WKLV
UHTXLUHVDµVXEVWDQWLDO¶FRPSHQVDWLRQ´ 
 
Obviously, these qualitative statements need to be translated into numerical weight 
bounds in order to solve (3a)-(3c).  Suppose, more explicitly, that one agrees to capture them 
in the weight bounds: 













    (;< representing categories I,II, and III,)  (4a)

























 (; representing categories I,II, and III),  (4b) 





























.                 (4c), 
and (recalling the original formulation in (3c)), 
                                                                                                                                                   
Z2IFRXUVHSUREOHPVVXFKDVWKHVHYDQLVKLIVWDWHGZHLJKWVDUHDOOVWULFWO\SRVLWLYH,QWHUHVWLQJO\DVWKH
preceeding footnote makes clear, individual expert weights are non-negative by construction in AHP.  In point of 
fact, experts’ AHP weights have been used to create restrictions such as those discussed in the main text in a 
benefit-of-the-doubt optimization problem (see e.g. Cooper, Seiford and Tone, 2000, p. 169-174).    22 
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Obviously, these restrictions implicitly define weight bounds between categories I-III 
and category V as well.  Appending them to (3a)-(3b) leads to the results summarized in 
Table 5.   Note that, in comparison with the results in table 4, the 1994 IMI values do not 
change very much, with some increasing and others decreasing, and discriminatory power 
remains high.  The most outspoken differences are those for Italy and Portugal.  One can see 
further that this is essentially due to the impact of (4b), i.e. the value judgment concerning 
trade-offs between the three ‘most important’ categories and category IV.  Of course, the 
particular bound values (4a)-(4c) that ZH propose may well deviate from those the IMAC 
members themselves would deem appropriate.  Since such information is lacking, the index 
values and endogenous weights shown in table 5 are unlikely to be the correct ones as far as 
the IMI is concerned. But the table illustrates the essence of the Foster and Sen argument, 
particularly since a mutual agreement on weight bounds is more likely to come about than 














  I  II  III  IV  V    
AT      26.9  31.6  31.6  9.4  0.6    
BE     26.9  31.6  31.6  9.4  0.6    
DE     27.3  32.1  32.1  8.0  0.5    
DK     28.2  33.2  28.2  9.9  0.6    
ES     26.8  31.5  31.5  9.4  0.9    
FI     26.9  31.6  31.6  9.4  0.6    
FR     26.9  31.6  31.6  9.4  0.6    
GR     32.1  32.1  27.3  8.0  0.5    
IE     28.1  33.0  28.1  9.8  1.0    
IT     28.2  33.2  28.2  9.9  0.6    
NL     26.8  31.5  31.5  9.4  0.9    
PT     28.2  33.2  28.2  9.9  0.6    
SE     28.7  33.2  28.7  8.4  0.5    
UK     28.2  33.2  28.2  9.9  0.6    
EU-15     26.9  31.6  31.6  9.4  0.6    
 
A similar analysis can be carried out for the 2000 data.  In the last column of table 5 
we confine ourselves to reporting the index values for that year.  One can see that, except for 
Germany, no country has a lower aggregate performance index value in 2000. Indeed, many   23 
of them have a value close to or equal to the maximum value as set in equation (3b).  To 
recall, this means that they are not demonstrably outperformed by other observations in the 
sample.  Clearly, this indicates that countries moved forward in terms of beneficial internal 
market effects.
16 However, there are better ways to focus the analysis on dynamical aspects 





This  section  applies  the  benefit-of-the-doubt  weighting  method  to  the  dynamic 
performance assessment of EU Internal Market effects. As we will show, there is a specific 
sense  in  which  this  approach  may  actually  deliver  more  information  than  one  normally 
retrieves from the output distance functions we employed in section 3.  To see this, recall that 
the benefit-of-the-doubt approach endogenises the identification of a country’s best practice 
observation as well. Clearly, such best practices may themselves alter over time.  Thus, apart 
from  the  mere  measurement  of  performance  shifts,  we  also  highlight  the  capacity  of  the 
method to disaggregate member states’ observed performance shifts into changes UHODWLYHWR 
the benchmarks and performance changes RI the benchmarks (i.e. catching up vis-à-vis the 
best practice versus genuine progress of the best practice itself). The aggregate performance 
index we propose is in fact strongly related to the Malmquist (1953) (output) quantity index, 
which is a ratio of two output distance functions, one using base period data and the other 
using comparison period data. The axiomatic properties of an output quantity index are e.g. 
described  by  Balk  (1998,  pp.  90-91).  Färe  HW DO  (1994)  popularised  the  methodology 
(including  the  decomposition  into  catching  up  and  best  practice  progress)  for  analyzing 
productivity changes; our following discussion adapts those ideas to the assessment of policy 
performance, and extends them by means of endogenously weighted composite indicators. 
We  specifically consider  performance changes between  a period  W  and a  subsequent 
period W+1; in our application W stands for the year 1994 and W+1 for 2000. Because we shift 
from an atemporal to an intertemporal analysis, our notation will deviate somewhat from that 
previously  used:  we  make  an  explicit  distinction  between  normalised  sub-indicators  and 
                                                
16 In fact, this can be discerned from the original disaggregated data: the move forward is indeed primarily due to 
improvements in sub-indicator values rather than e.g. to changes in weights.  Only price variables show, on 
average, a mixed picture in this respect. Germany’s modest overall decline is largely due to its deterioration in 
intra-EU FDI (dropping back to slightly over one third of the 1994 value of 0.5% of GDP).  This cannot be 
compensated by the (marginally weaker) performance in its population variable nor by the increase in intra-EU 
trade (since, in fact, a country as Sweden still outperforms Germany on that latter dimension).             24 
weights pertaining to the base period W versus those for period W1. For any country M, the L-th 
normalised sub-indicator for each period O (O = W or W1) is presented as
17 
) 1 , (
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      (5a), 
while the corresponding weights are denoted as 
( ) ,  1
￿
￿ Z O W W = +       (5b). 
  In the following, we first discuss the measurement of overall performance change. 
Next, we decompose performance change into catching up and environmental change (which 
is reflected in different best practices, or “genuine progress”). To facilitate the presentation, 
we first take the aggregation weights (see (5b)) for periods W and W+1 as given; and we address 
computational  issues  following  from  endogenizing  those  weights  afterwards.  After  the 
methodological part, we present the results of our application. 
 
$ 0HDVXULQJLQWHUQDOPDUNHWSHUIRUPDQFHFKDQJH
Measuring performance change between periods W and W+1 essentially boils down to 
comparing the aggregate (or weighted) sub-indicator performance in the two periods. Given 
this,  there  essentially  are  two  possibilities for  aggregating  the  different  (normalised)  sub-
indicators: one may use either the period W weights or the period W+1 weights. (Recall that, for 
simplicity, we first assume that these weights are known.) Using the period W weights yields 
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      (6b). 
                                                
17 For each sub-indicator Lthe same base value 
«
‹ \  will be used in periods W and W+1.  To recall, we take 
›
ﬁ \  as 
the EU-15 mean for 1992.   25 
The  interpretation  is  clear:  values  above  unity  for  the  measures  (6a)  and  (6b)  indicate 
performance progress, whereas values below unity have the opposite interpretation.  
Still, given that the aggregation weights will generally be different for the two time 
periods, the two performance change measures will usually have different values. It may even 
occur that the two measures yield conflicting conclusions; e.g., the measure (6a) may indicate 
performance progress while the alternative (6b) suggests performance regress. To avoid an 
arbitrary base of comparison, we suggest a performance change measure that is calculated as 
the geometric mean of the measures (6a) and (6b): 
1/ 2 1/2
, 1 , 1
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   (7). 
Obviously,  this  (“Fisher  ideal”)  metric  preserves  the  intuitive  interpretation  of  the 
above two measures: a value above unity indicates performance progress of country M between 
W and W1; and a value below unity indicates performance regress. 
 
% 'HFRPSRVLQJLQWHUQDOPDUNHWSHUIRUPDQFHFKDQJH
 The  performance  shift  metric  (7)  is  instrumental  to  know  whether  a  country  has 
advanced or not, but is silent on the question whether this performance change is mainly 
idiosyncratic  rather  than  a  result  of  generally  changed  circumstances,  which,  intuitively, 
would be revealed by changes in best practices.  However, (7) can precisely be decomposed 
into (i) a part that  is attributable to  the country-specific better  (resp.  worse)  performance 
relative to the best practice benchmark in period W1 as compared to period W and (ii) a part 
that is attributable to overall better (resp. worse) practice in period W1 as compared to period 
W, including a better (resp. worse) performance of the best practice benchmark itself. In the 
following, we label part (i) as ‘catching up’ vis-à-vis the best practice: it captures the better 
(resp.  worse)  performance  that  is  effectively  due  to  country  M’s  catching  up  (resp.  losing 
ground) relative to the best possible performance. Next, we label part (ii) as ‘environmental 
change’. At heart, it exactly reflects genuine progress, viz. changes of the best practices in 
period W1 as compared to the base period W.  These changes essentially indicate different 
performance possibilities following from a more (resp. less) favorable environment, which 
defines the scope for policy-making.   26 
To obtain the decomposition, we first multiply the numerator and the denominator of 
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   (9c). 
 
The expression (9a) presents the performance shift measure 
˝
3&  as the product of a 
‘catching  up’  component 
˛
&8  and  an  ‘environmental  change’  component 
˛
(& .  The  first 
component captures the extent to which the evaluated country M gets closer to its best practice 
benchmark in period W1 as compared to period W; see (9b).  The second component measures 
shifts in the best possible performance between periods W and W+1, which in turn reflects a 
more favorable policy environment. To see this interpretation of 
˛
(& , consider the first factor 
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i.e., the distance from country M’s performance in period W+1 to the best practice in period W1 
exceeds that to the best practice in period W. If this inequality holds, then this suggests that   27 
better  practice  has  become  possible  in  period  W+1  as  compared  to  period  W.  A  similar 
interpretation  applies  for  the  second  factor  of  the  geometric  mean  in  (9c),  but  now  the 
distances relate to country M’s performance in period W. Like before, taking the geometric mean 
avoids choosing an arbitrary base of comparison (i.e., country M’s performance in period W or in 
period W+1). 
Obviously, both catching upand environmental change components can take values 
above  and  below unity. 
˛
&8  and 
˛
(&  values  above  unity  indicate  performance  progress, 
while the opposite interpretation holds for values below unity. Note that the two components 
may move in opposite directions. For example, performance progress may occur because of a 
more  favorable  environment  while  the  relative  distance  from  the  best  possible  practice 
deteriorates (i.e., the catching up value is below unity), or YLFHYHUVD. Of course, it is possible 
that a country obtains a 100% value for the first component (e.g. because in each of the two 
periods it acts as a ‘contemporaneous’ best practice), and still has a value above/below 100% 
for the second factor (as it its performance improved/worsened over time, judged by cross-
comparison  with  the  observations  of the  other time  period).  The above  decomposition  of 
performance change is intuitive as both catching up and environmental change have a clear 
impact on the perception of overall performance shifts. 
A  final  point  of  attention  concerns  the  computation  of  the  metrics 
˛
3&  and  its 
components 
˛
&8  and 
˛
(&  when  exact  weighting  information  is  not available.  Consistent 
with our previous discussion, we suggest a benefit-of-the-doubt approach in such a case. In 
this respect, we note that the constituent components of (9b) and (9c) have the same formal 
structure  as  the  performance  ratio  in  (3a).  Specifically,  they  include  four  ratios  of  the 
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￿ Z Z Z         (10c) 
In this problem, the weight set :is constructed in the same way as before (see our discussion 
of (4a)-(4d)). The value 
2
￿
Q  refers to the number of countries observed in the time period O2( 





+ = = .) Like (3a)-(3c), this non-
linear programming problem may be converted into a linear program; the reasoning is directly 
adapted from Cherchye HWDO. (2004, p. 934).  

& (PSLULFDODSSOLFDWLRQ
Table 6 reports the changes in IMI performance between 1994 and 2000; these results 
are obtained under the relative weight restrictions (4a)-(4d). A first observation is that internal 
market performance has generally improved; the average improvement amounts to almost 
67%  (i.e.,  the  difference  between  166.89%  and  the  VWDWXV TXR  value  100%).  In  fact, 
performance  progress  for  individual  countries  is  often  substantial:  for  example,  Spain, 
Finland, France, The Netherlands, Portugal, Sweden and the UK improved performance by 
more than 50%. Finally, if the ‘average’ EU country (see EU-15) did exist, it would have 
increased its overall performance by slightly more than 100% (recall again that ‘EU-15’ is the 
score of the average of the individual country category values).  
Next, when focusing on the individual components of these overall performance shifts, 
an interesting finding is that the environmental change values systematically (and largely) 
exceed  the  catching  up  values.  This  suggests  that  the  overall  better  internal  market 
performance  is almost  exclusively  due  to a  more  favorable environment  (i.e. an enlarged 
scope  for  policy  performance  in  the  EU).  In  fact,  the  environmental  change  value  is 
everywhere  above  100%,  and  in  some  cases  even  above  200%  (see  Finland,  France,  the 
Netherlands, Portugal and the UK).  Stated differently, as judged by the composite index, 
Internal Market Policy may well have led to better best practices: one interpretation of the 
results is indeed that European policy-makers have succeeded in creating an environment that 
has  fostered  integration.    This  finding  is  underscored  further  by  the  observation  that  DOO  29 
individual observations’ 2000-values lie above the 1994 best practice frontier.
18 On the other 
hand, none of the 1994 observations comes out as best practice when compared with the 2000 
frontier.  
Specific country results provide further intuition. In that respect, it is interesting to 
compare  the  environmental  change  values  for  countries  with  catching  up  components  of 
100%, reflecting that they are best practice in 1994 as well as 2000. For compactness, we 
focus  on  the  specific  example  of  Sweden  and  Greece  (but  a  straightforwardly  similar 
reasoning applies for other comparisons that include Belgium, The Netherlands, Portugal or 
the  UK).  The environmental  change component  amounts  to  104.89% for  Greece  (i.e.  the 
minimum value in our sample), while it equals as much as 157.00% for Sweden. In view of 
the formal expression (9c), this finding can be given a specific interpretation in terms of 
evaluating the beneficial effects of the more favorable policy environment in 2000 at different 
(best  practice)  ‘policy  mixes’  (i.e.,  the  country-specific  configurations  of  the  single-
dimensional performances). For the current example, it means that the environmental change 
has  contributed  to  better  performance  much  more  substantially  at  the  more  equilibrated 
Swedish policy mix than at the strongly specialized Greek one, which is in turn reflected in 
the overall performance change results for these two countries. 
Another insightful example is Finland.  When judged in the contemporaneous time 
frame, Finland’s results for 1994 and 2000 are 100% and 81.53%, respectively. Recalling 
expression (9b), the latter two values explain the value of Finland’s ‘catching up’ (or better: 
‘falling behind’) score in table 6. Next, evaluating the 1994 performance with respect to the 
2000 best possible practice yields a value of 53.04%, while assessing the 2000 performance 
by the 1994 environment obtains 203.17%. Combining this with the first two index values 
yields  the  environmental  change  component  of  % 04 . 53 / % 100 % 53 . 81 / % 17 . 203  = 
216.73%; see (9c).  
While genuine progress is  common to all countries, some countries improved less 
rapidly than others, a feature which is reflected by their falling behind (i.e. column 1). Again, 
one can take the above Finnish example (81.53%/100%)  as an  illustration. Only a single 
country (Spain) obtains a catching up value that strictly exceeds 100%, as it moves from a 
dominated  position  in  1994  to  one  of  the  best  practices  in  the  2000  subsample.  The 
                                                
18 This feature can not directly be inferred from table 6; it relates to the numerator of the first factor in expression 
(9c), which lies above 100% for each observation (ranging from 127.93% to no less than 516.49%, with an 
average value of 248.20%).   30 
predominant  impact  of  the  more  favorable  policy  environment  also  appears  from  the 
summarizing statistics at the bottom of Table 6. 

7DEOH  3HUIRUPDQFH FKDQJH DQG LWV FRPSRQHQWV FRPSO\LQJ ZLWK
H[SHUWV¶ FRPPRQ MXGJPHQW µ%¶ DV GHWDLOHG IXUWKHU LQ HTXDWLRQV D
G) 
 &DWFKLQJXS (QYLURQPHQWDOFKDQJH 2YHUDOOSHUIRUPDQFHFKDQJH
AT  98.46%  143.79%  141.57% 
BE  100.00%  136.19%  136.19% 
DE  90.59%  130.50%  118.21% 
DK  95.71%  137.09%  131.20% 
ES  116.23%  143.76%  167.10% 
FI  81.53%  216.73%  176.71% 
FR  84.13%  235.98%  198.54% 
GR  100.00%  104.89%  104.89% 
IE  99.44%  124.93%  124.23% 
IT  96.83%  138.39%  134.01% 
NL  100.00%  228.33%  228.33% 
PT  100.00%  239.78%  239.78% 
SE  100.00%  157.00%  157.00% 
UK  100.00%  243.68%  243.68% 
EU-15  98.35%  205.35%  201.97% 
Average  97.42%  172.43%  166.89% 
Max  116.23%  243.68%  243.68% 
Min  81.53%  104.89%  104.89% 
Median  99.44%  143.79%  157.00% 
 
 
Our approach should be contrasted with the way the DFWXDOIMI is constructed, since in 
the  latter  case  one  measures  progress  with  a  fixed  weighting  scheme  and,  therefore,  one 
implicitly evaluates each country relative to some (exogenous) ‘average’ point of reference. 
By  contrast,  the  approach  presented  above  is  primarily  concerned  with  identifying  EHVW
practices ZLWKLQ the set of observations, with shifts of these best practices over time, and with 
gauging  country  performance  relative  to  these  best  practices.    This  means  that  it  is 
problematical to compare the magnitude of our indices with findings such as “the index for 
the EU as a whole improved by 60 points in the period 1994-2002” (Tarantola HWDO, 2004, p.   31 
11).
19  Even though such a strict comparison is somewhat tricky, it is still interesting to note 
that our average performance improvement value (of almost 67%) is close in magnitude to the 
‘fixed weight’-IMI estimate reported by Tarantola HWDO (2004).  
Of course, like before, this application mainly serves illustrative purposes. As a result, 
the above findings are at best interpreted as indicative rather than conclusive. Still, in our 
opinion, they do highlight the potential of the outlined procedure for inter-temporal policy 
performance analysis. Specifically within the European context, it seeks to address the crucial  
question whether internal market performance progress is mainly due to favorable policy-
environmental  changes,  or  rather  to  country-specific  catching-up  effects.  Our  analysis 
suggests quite clearly that the main driver of internal market performance progress has been 





Booysen (2002, p.131) summarized the debate on composite indicators by noting that 
“not one single element of the methodology of composite indexing is above criticism”.  As 
indicated above, we think this lack of consensus is actually a defining feature of composite 
indicators, and in fact constitutes the unifying thread that links several critical issues in this 
area.  
Before offering some concluding observations on the specific methodology reviewed 
we  re-iterate  that  an  alternative  –or  rather:  complementary–  approach  to  assess  the 
uncertainties  surrounding  the  construction  of  composite  indicators  is  to  present  the 
calculations with extensive uncertainty and sensitivity analysis.   We have refrained from 
doing so in our illustrative example, but we fully agree with Saisana HWDO (2005) that for 
practical applications such analyses are warranted.  In fact, the specific type of global analysis 
used by these authors can readily be applied to benefit-of-the-doubt models.   As the indices 
(3) and (10) hinge on the selection of best practice benchmarks, sensitivity to outliers may be 
a concern here perhaps more than with other composite indicators.  A notable example in our 
own  sample  was  Greece,  with  its  exceptional  performance  in  terms  of  published  public 
procurement, which we treated as a reliable observation in our analysis. If one casts doubt on 
                                                
19 Direct comparisons with the numerical values of the actual IMI are further complicated by the fact that its 
authors use a different normalisation procedure (to wit, a z-score transformation) of the original sub-indicator 
values.      32 
the quality of the underlying values, one could always perform a robustness assessment of the 
results (see, e.g., Cazals HWDO, 2002)  
One way to interpret Booysen’s remark is that the normalisation issue should not be 
regarded  as  an  isolated  stage  in  the  construction  methodology;  it  too  pops  up because
ultimately there is no consensus on the proper underlying scientific model for aggregating 
‘apples and oranges’ in a composite indicator.
20  Regarding normalisation, one well-known 
feature of (3a)-(3b) is that the eventual value of the composite gauge is invariant to ratio-scale 
transformations of the original sub-indicators in the ‘unrestricted’ case where Z
￿ IRUDOO
L 1,...P. (see e.g.  Cooper HWDO, 2000, p. 24). In general, this is no longer ascertained when, 
as in our approach, weight restrictions are introduced.  In this respect, however, we point out 
that (a) the (individually meaningful) preliminary ratio-scale transformations in fact guarantee 
independence of measurement units and, as a result, (b) that the combination of such pre-
normalised sub-indicators with relative weight restrictions is in fact equivalent to restricting 




Evidently,  this  also  holds  for  the  Malmquist-type  of  performance  index  discussed  in  the 
previous section. 
We recall that the so resulting index has some desirable axiomatic properties (e.g., 
weak monotonicity, independence of units of measurement, proportionality,...) but also that 
other traditional desiderata are not, or are only partially, met.  Specifically, one may feel 
unease with the fact that endogenous weighting (and the concomittant endogenous choice of a 
best practice observation) ultimately prevents a conventional ordering (i.e. an ordering on the 
basis of a common, fixed objective function).  In fact, we think this is actually an attractive 
way to “preserve theambiguity”, and that uniform weighting is an instance of “trying to 
remove it through some arbitrary complete ordering”, to recall again the Foster and Sen (1997) 
                                                
20 The aggregation of apples and oranges (or of apples and scientific journals) is a rather uncontroversial problem 
when constructing GDP, even if goods and services are strictly speaking not really commensurable.  The trick to 
render them so is of course by multiplying with market prices, i.e. to work with monetary values.  Trivial as this 
example may be, it proves the point made above, and also by Ebert and Welsch (2004, p. 271) that “arbitrary 
choices of measurement units can be accommodated on the basis of known scientific relationships”.  In the 
GDP-example, the ‘known scientific relationship’ requires a sufficient consensus that prices are sensible weights 
(e.g. because they are taken to represent relative factor productivities or marginal utilities).  
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0 ) ~ ( / ) ~ ( .  As in a Lowe quantity index, such hybrid weights combine the 
weights for observation Mwith thesub-indicator values for the base observation\
￿
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recommendations.  But  others  may  disagree  on  this,  especially  in  view  of  the  fact  that 
composite  indicators  are  sometimes  used  to  provide  a  country  ranking.    On  this  account 
however, the proposed methodology is in fact sufficiently flexible: LI the experts’ judgments 
point in such direction, one can incorporate the restriction that endogenous weights should be 
‘similar’ or even ‘the same’ for all observations.  See e.g. Cherchye and Kuosmanen (2004), 
Kuosmanen et al. (2005), Despotis (2004). 
With regard to the issue of weight flexibility, it should additionally be noted that our 
findings regarding performance dynamics are not primarily a consequence of the particular 
weight  restrictions  we  imposed,  but  rather  of  our  use  of  a  theoretical  construct  which 
decomposes  dynamics.  To  recall:  expressions  (9a)-(9c)  allow  to  check  the  primacy  of 
environmental change over catching up also if explicit weights would have been available for 
the respective time periods.  Yet evidently, common agreement on sets of weights, one set for 
each time-period considered, is even more unlikely than in an atemporal context. Thus the 
(constrained) benefit-of-the-doubt approach to resolve remaining disagreements surely retains 
its attractive character.   
A quite different possible criticism is that we have taken inspiration from the literature 
on  (Malmquist)  TXDQWLW\  indices,  without  accounting  for  the  real  possibility  that  better 
(‘output’) performance may have its price either in terms of diminished performance in other 
areas or in terms of the inputs that are needed in order to improve ‘output’ performance.   
Partly, this is due to the fact that many composite indicators only look at one side of the 
equation.  In any case, the approach we presented is readily amenable to address issues of 
SURGXFWLYLW\change, for cases in which sub-indicator data can be categorized as outputs or 
inputs: as we have indicated in section 5, the idea of decomposing a (Malmquist) index into a 
catching up component and a best practice shift in fact originates from SURGXFWLYLW\ indices 
rather  than  TXDQWLW\ indices  (see  Diewert  and  Nakamura,  2003,  for  a  recent  summary  of 
appropriate  productivity indices).  Nonetheless, the Malmquist decomposition yields policy-
relevant information even when focusing on outcome variables only.  Our empirical analysis 
illustrates this, as it strongly suggests that ‘Europe’  created  an environment conducive to 
global performance improvement, and that the overwhelming majority of EU-15 members 
have  exploited  the  opportunity,  albeit  to  different  degrees.    In  fact,  our  decomposition 
suggests  that  many  countries  could  have  done  an  even  better  job  in  this  respect.  Such  a 
finding cannot be delivered by the Internal Market Index, which is incapable of identifying 
the sources of the observed performance improvement.   34 
Finally, and more generally, we stress again that the particular benefit-of-the-doubt 
approach we discussed is not a universal panacea for building composite indicators.  As in 
other areas, it holds that the ‘best’ index is contingent on the specific context at hand.  The 
prime feature it possesses is that, unlike the Internal Market Index itself, it respects diversity 
of  expert  judgement  by  incorporating  ambiguity  into  a  specific  method  used  to  create  a 
composite indicator.  Whatever the specific details of the eventual composite indicator, we are 
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the lower and upper bounds are taken as the minimum and maximum relative weights for each pair (LM) 
over the expert panel.  We here illustrate this approach at the level of the five categories discerned in the 
main text.   The category weights per IMAC member are listed in table A1. 
7DEOH$
   AT  BE  DE  DK  ES  FI  FR  GR  IE  IT  NL  PT  SE  UK 
Category I  10  25  40  30  25  10  10  38  30  65  30  15  30  20 
II  45  45  15  55  35  55  65  12  40  25  2  30  30  10 
III  25  30  45  0  40  35  0  30  30  10  60  40  25  40 
IV  20  0  0  15  0  0  25  20  0  0  8  15  15  20 
V  0  0  0  0  0  0  0  0  0  0  0  0  0  10 
 
The next step is then to calculate relative weights per expert, after which minima and maxima are 
set as bounds.  For example, the minimum ZII/ ZI in the table above is given by the Dutch IMAC-member 
(2/30), the maximum ZII/ ZI is France’s 65/10, max ZIII/ ZII = 4 (UK), etc.  Due to the many zeroes in the 
above table, we make the assumption that 0/0 = 0, [/0 ® ¥ for[>0. In fact, this implies that no weight 
constraints can be imposed directly (i.e. on the basis of the table) for the pairs (III,IV), (III,V) and (IV,V).  
(Recall though that expression 3c requires that all single-indicator weights are positive.  This requirement 
continues to hold here).  Proceeding as such eventually yields the following weight restrictions for problem 
(3a-b): 
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The  results  are  given  in  table  A2.    The  ‘wide  disagreement’  that  is  captured  by  the  broad 
restrictions is of course directly mirrored both by the large increase in the benefit-of-the-doubt index values 
and by the dispersion in the associated optimal weights.  Comparison of tables A1 and A2 shows that there 
may be rather wide divergence between national expert’s original scheme and the corresponding scheme 
for their country following the benefit-of-the-doubt approach (although the lack of importance for category 
V, i.e. the pension fund indicator, is a consistent and notable finding in both approaches).  Whether this 
implies that the panel should favor A1 from the start and directly should apply each national expert’s 
proposal exclusively to the corresponding member state, is questionable.  First, because this is tantamount 
to adding further (in fact extremely narrow) restrictions to model (3a-c). Put differently: this means that   37 
country values will FHWHULVSDULEXV never be higher than in table A2.  Second, because in terms of Foster 
and Sen’s argument, a direct application of A1-weights on their respective countries means constructing 
indices in a context of ‘universal disagreement on values’.  With an eye towards real EU decision making, 
this seems a non-starter. Conversely, A2 de facto implies ‘universal agreement on bounds’.
 
7DEOH$,0,¶VIRUFRPSO\LQJZLWKSDQHO¶VXSSHUDQGORZHUERXQGV
    Weights per category 
 
,QGH[
9DOXH   I  II  III  IV  V 
AT     17.3  22.1  60.6  0.0  0.0 
BE     7.4  48.1  25.9  18.5  0.0 
DE     9.1  59.1  31.8  0.0  0.0 
DK     29.8  29.8  29.8  10.5  0.0 
ES     10.0  65.0  0.0  25.0  0.0 
FI     8.5  55.3  15.0  21.3  0.0 
FR     7.5  48.6  25.3  18.7  0.0 
GR     43.3  56.7  0.0  0.0  0.0 
IE     8.7  56.3  13.5  21.6  0.0 
IT     10.0  65.0  0.0  25.0  0.0 
NL     9,5  62,0  22.0  6.4  0.0 
PT     19,0  17,5  16.0  47.6  0.0 
SE     9,1  59,0  31.7  0.0  0.0 
UK     10.0  65.0  0.0  25.0  0.0 
EU-15     7,5  48,6  25.2  18.7  0.0 
 
  